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OIL AND GAS
Upstream
Posse Energy, Ltd. v. Parsley Energy, LP, No. 08-20-00061-CV, 2021 WL
3140054 (Tex. App. July 26, 2021).
Posse Energy (“Posse”) filed for a declaratory judgment and motion for
summary judgment against Pacer Energy (“Pacer”), arguing that the
conveyance of an oil and gas lease known as the Morgan Lease included
rights to all depths. Conversely, Pacer argued that the assignment to Posse
only included shallow rights because (1) the intent of the acquisition
agreement and circumstances show that the depth was limited, and (2) no
production at deep depths occurred at the time of the conveyance. Parsley
Energy (“Parsley”) later acquired its interest from Pacer. Parsley filed a
motion for summary judgment, claiming that the Morgan Lease only
conveyed 24.2333% of the interest regardless of depth. The trial court
denied Parsley and Posse’s motions, and entered summary judgment in
favor of Pacer. Both Posse and Parsley appealed the judgment. The primary
issue addressed by the Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso, was whether the
Morgan Lease conveyed quarter sections in their entirety (shallow and deep
depths) or limited them to just shallow depths. The court held that the intent
of the conveyed interests was limited to shallow depths based on several
findings. First, the express language of the acquisition agreement and other
documents showed the intent did not include deep depths because deep
rights were never a part of the prior deed, and the term “insofar and only
insofar” showed a limitation on conveyance. Second, the only units in
production at the time were in shallow depths. Third, the property’s
location was referenced within the Spraberry trend, which was only located
in the shallow section. Ultimately, the court found that the acquisition
agreement and assignment conveyed no leasehold interests deeper than
8,900 feet. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and
concluded that there was no need to reach Parsley’s cross-appeal.
Romeo v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:17CV88, 2021 WL 2933176 (N.D.
W.Va. July 12, 2021).
A class action group of plaintiffs leased their oil and gas interests to
Antero Resources Corporation (“Antero”). The group, led by Romeo,
alleged that Antero breached contract by deducting post-production costs
from royalty payments. A similar case, Corder v. Antero Res. Corp., No.
1:18CV30, 2021 WL 1912383 (N.D. W. Va., May 12, 2021), was currently
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under appeal in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Antero moved to stay
the case until Corder was resolved, arguing that its outcome would affect
this case. Romeo argued that Antero was only seeking a stay to delay
monetary recovery for the class action group. The United States District
Court, North District of West Virginia considered multiple factors in
granting Antero’s motion to stay. First, the court found that the judicial
economy leaned heavily towards staying the case because it was extremely
similar to Corder due to several contractual provisions that were identical
in both cases. If the case was not stayed, and Corder was reversed or
vacated, the court would be forced to reconsider the case. This would result
in a waste of resources and finances. Second, the court found that the
hardship Antero faced also pointed towards staying the case because if the
stay was denied, Antero would face irreparable harm in expenses. Third, the
court determined that the potential prejudice to Romeo and the other
plaintiffs was not unfair because (1) there were no prior settlement
negotiations, (2) Corder would be resolved in a timely manner, and (3)
Corder would address the primary issue of the present case. Accordingly,
the court granted Antero’s motion to stay pending the resolution of appeal
in Corder. The court directed the parties to advise it when the Fourth
Circuit issued a final decision in Corder.
BBX Operating, LLC v. American Fluorite, Inc., NO. 09-19-00278-CV,
2021 WL 3196514 (Tex. App. July 29, 2021).
BBX Operating, LLC (BBX) and American Fluorite, Inc., GeoSouthern
Energy Partners, LP, and GeoSouthern Energy Corp. (collectively,
“GeoSouthern”) entered joint development agreements (JDAs) setting the
terms for well proposal submissions and including authorization for
expenditure (AFEs), detailing costs. . After interest owners agreeing to
participate, BBX would send joint interest billings to BBX (JIBs) for
monthly costs to each participating interest owner. In May 2015, BBX sent
nine “cash calls” to GeoSouthern entities, asserting the authority of the
contracts in dispute here, “Neches II” Area of Mutual Interest (AMI) and
the “Make My Day” JDA. GeoSouthern asserted they did not owe payment
unless for a well proposal in which they consented. In August 2015, BBX
withheld GeoSouthern’s revenue payments. GeoSouthern demanded release
of revenue payments, subsequently filing suit. BBX appealed on the trial
court’s final summary judgment against BBX in its entirety. Seven issues
were considered on appeal. The Appellant Court affirmed trial court’s
judgment on five issues: The breach of contract claim was overruled,
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because GeoSouthern established its damages and no material breach of the
contract was found; Declaratory judgment was overruled, because the
consequence of non-participation under the contract was clear and did not
include offsetting or netting revenues; The quantum meruit claim was
overruled, because the JDA contracts expressly covered the services at
issue. Promissory estoppel was barred as a matter of law because an express
contract governs the subject matter of the parties’ dispute; The Texas
Natural Resources Code (TNRC) claim was overruled because the preinterest amount accounted for revenue amounts not paid by BBX. The
Appellant Court reversed the prejudgment interest issue and the attorneys’
fees issue, remanded a prejudgment interest calculation under the Texas
Natural Resources Code instead of Texas Finance Code, and remanded
regarding the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees.
Ramirez v. Quanta Servs. Inc., No. H-20-1698, 2021 WL 3089295 (S.D.
Tex. July 22, 2021).
A Subcontractor on an oil-and-gas rig sued his Roommate’s Employer
for Roommate’s negligence in providing aid during Subcontractor’s
medical emergency. Employer moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Roommate neither owed nor breached any duty to Subcontractor. The court
granted the motion based on several findings. First, undisputed facts show
that, under Louisiana negligence law, Roommate did not have a general
duty to assist, nor did Roommate create a duty through causing the need for
the aid, discouraging others from giving aid, or the existence of a special
relationship. Second, even if Roommate did owe a duty to Subcontractor,
undisputed evidence shows that he did not breach it because he lacked
authority to control the medical emergency and he did not delay in getting
medical attention. Further, Subcontractor does not point to affirmative acts
Roommate took to exercise control after notifying the Person-in-Charge or
to acts of omission that delayed the Person-in-Charge’s assumption of
control. Even if the timeline is disputed, the dispute is immaterial. Because
no genuine dispute as to any material facts exists, the movant is entitled to
judgement as a matter of law. The court granted the motion for summary
judgement and dismissed with prejudice Subcontractor’s claims against
Employer.
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Epsilon Energy USA, Inc. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, Civil No. 1:21CV-00658, 2021 WL 1945699, slip op. (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2021).
Epsilon Energy USA, Inc. (“Epsilon”) sought a preliminary injunction
related to its Joint Operation Agreements (“JOAs”) with Chesapeake
Appalachia, LLC (“Chesapeake”). Previously, the parties settled a dispute
over the JOAs. The settlement resulted in an agreement that Chesapeake
would cooperate with proposals under the JOAs even where it did not
consent to a proposal. The present suit arose when Chesapeake, the default
operator under the JOAs, later refused to participate in the drilling of a new
well. Epsilon sought declaratory relief, regarding its right to drill the well
and access jointly owned assets to do so. Further, Epsilon claimed breach of
the JOAs and its settlement agreement. In order to succeed in its motion for
preliminary injunctive relief a party must establish a sufficient likelihood of
success on the merits of the case. Epsilon argued the JOAs allow for a JOA
party to act as operator in place of Chesapeake if Chesapeake chooses not
to participate in the proposal. Chesapeake rebutted, claiming Epsilon failed
to properly execute the procedures to replace the operator in accordance
with the JOAs. The court agreed, pointing also to Epsilon’s
misinterpretation of the plain language of the JOAs. Further, Epsilon’s
proposed commencement date for the drilling of the well passed. However,
Epsilon argued that its motion for preliminary injunctive relief is not moot
because it is entitled to an extension of the deadline, under the JOAs, due to
a purported title defect. The court held that Epsilon was not entitled to an
extension because the relevant article of the JOAs required all JOA parties
to consent to a proposal in order to permit an extension. Thus, the
likelihood of success on the merits of the case was insufficient to sustain a
preliminary injunction.
Sundown Energy LP v. HJSA No. 3, Ltd. P'ship, 622 S.W.3d 884 (Tex.
2021).
Lessor filed suit against Lessee seeking to terminate the oil-and-gas lease
due to lessee’s failure to maintain continuous drilling operations. Lessor
sued under a breach of contract claim, arguing the “continuous drilling
program” provision of the lease provided for termination as to nonproducing tracts due to a special limitation that required lessee to timely
“spud-in” new wells. Lessor contends that to maintain the lease, Lessee had
to spud-in a new well every 120 days following the completion or
abandonment of operations on a prior well. Lessee counterclaimed that the
lease’s plain language allowed the lease to be maintained by engaging in
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“drilling operations” which included drilling, reworking, fracturing, and
other well operations not limited to “spudding-in” new wells. The parties
disputed whether the broader definition of “drilling operations” in one
paragraph of the contract applies to the continuous drilling program
provision or whether the provision’s context provides a different definition
that meant only spudding-in a new well. The trial court granted partial
summary judgment for Lessee. On permissive interlocutory appeal, a
divided court of appeals reversed, finding the provision assigned a more
specific definition that controlled over the general definition. The dissent
found the court’s reversal against the plain language of the contract. The
Supreme Court of Texas agreed, observing that the parties expressly agreed
that the broad definition would apply whenever that phrase is used in the
lease. The Court found they cannot substitute “spudded-in” for “drilling
operations” when the parties did not choose to do so. The Court found
Lessor’s concern that Lessee could stymie production to be unpersuasive,
as Lessee retains the implied duty to reasonably develop the leased
premises and nothing in the lease relieves that duty. The Court reversed the
appellate court finding that lessee’s timely drilling operations delayed the
reassignment of non-producing tracts.
MRC Permian Co. v. Point Energy Partners Permian LLC, 624 S.W.3d 643
(Tex. 2011).
Former Lessee (“Lessee”) filed suit against lessors and subsequent lessee
to protect its leasehold interests in leases executed with four mineral estate
owners. The lease provided a primary term and upon expiration, Lessee’s
interest automatically terminated all lands and depths not included in a
production unit. Lessee could suspend termination by conducting a
continuous drilling program. The lease included a force majeure clause
extending a continuous drilling deadline in the event of a non-economic
event beyond lessee’s control which delayed its operations. Lessee was
operating within the continuous drilling program when it encountered offsite wellbore instability that delayed a rig’s arrival. Lessee provided notice
to lessors yet received a response from subsequent Lessee to release all
interest in the leases outside the specified production units. Lessee then
filed suit. The trial court ruled on competing motions for summary
judgment and permitted the parties to pursue an interlocutory appeal on
three identified controlling questions of law: (1) whether the force majeure
clause operated to perpetuate the lease, (2) if the lease terminated, what
acreage was retained in Production Units, and (3) if the leases did not
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terminate, whether the Lessee had valid claims of tortious interference. The
Court of Appeals of Texas found as to question (1) that off-lease delays can
fall within the force majeure clause’s scope and such delays are not
required to be a substantial factor in Lessee’s failure to meet its deadline.
They further found the issue to be fact determinative. The court declined to
answer question (2) finding that a ruling on the quantity of retained acreage
would rely on contingent or hypothetical facts resulting in an impermissible
advisory opinion. The court found question (3) contained genuine issues of
material fact as to each element of Lessee’s tortious interference claims that
would require a jury.
SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., 219 A.3d 888 (Pa. 2021).
Lessors filed a complaint in equity against lessees claiming abandonment
of the leases. Lessors sought several remedies including injunctive relief,
declaratory judgment, and damages for conversion and moved for partial
summary judgment on those counts. The trial court granted the motion and
the Superior Court affirmed. Lessee appealed, claiming that Lessor failed to
provide notice of a default that would open a 30-day window of opportunity
to cure any defaults as written in the lease. Lessee further argued the ruling
failed to give effect to the express terms of the lease, which provided the
remedy in the event of an uncured breach. The lease further stated that if a
court determined that a default had not been timely cured, the exclusive
remedy was termination. Lessor argued that when a duty of reasonable
diligence goes unmet for an extended time, a presumption of abandonment
is created by the lessee. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found the
analysis of both lower courts lacked the initial step of determining whether
the case could be resolvable by employing the equitable doctrine of
abandonment. Injunctive relief is applicable when there is no adequate
remedy at law. The essential element of the doctrine of abandonment is the
party’s intention, not the party’s non-performance. The Court found that
Lessor’s allegations of various breaches of the lease did not evidence the
intention of lessees to abandon its property rights under the lease.
Furthermore, lessors failed to explain why the remedies provided in the
lease agreement were unavailable or inadequate. The pursuit of an equitable
remedy was improperly used to bypass the notice requirement of the lease.
The Court reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to perform a
contractual analysis to determine if an adequate remedy at law existed.
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State ex rel. Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P., 2021-0080, 2021 WL 1997498 (La.
App. 1 Cir. May 19, 2021).
A landowner (“appellant) sought to remediate contamination caused to
property by multiple companies’ (“appellees”) oil and gas exploration
activities. The district court sustained the appellees’ objection asserting a
peremptory exception of prescription, finding that the one-year liberative
prescription period prevented the appellant’s action. Sustaining this
objection, the court dismissed in favor of the appellees. Appellant appealed
from the district court judgment. Appellant alleged that on-tract companies
operated numerous oil and gas wells on his property, which included the
construction of and use of unlined earthen pits that have never been closed,
or not closed in conformance with Statewide Order 29-B, L.A.C.
43:XIX.101, et seq. Appellant further alleged that the off-tract companies
drilled and operated oil and gas wells on adjacent property that caused
contamination of his property in violation of Statewide Order 29-B. In the
district court, the appellees raised two objections, one seeking to dismiss
under a peremptory exception stating there was no cause of action, and
another seeking to dismiss under a dilatory exception of prematurity. The
district court sustained these objections, and thereafter appellant amended
his petition to satisfy the objections. In response to the amended complaint,
the appellees filed an objection for a peremptory exception of prescription
for dilatory action, pursuant to a one-year liberative prescription period.
The district court sustained the objection and dismissed the appellant from
the suit. The appellate court disagreed with the district court and held the
appellee’s peremptory exception is properly dismissed following the
legislature’s intention that actions under La. R.S. 30:16, which are premised
on inaction from the Commission of Conservation, invoke the State of
Louisiana as the party of interest and are not subject to a one-year liberative
prescriptive period for delictual actions. The appellate court reversed and
remanded to the district court.
Hill v. Welsh, 2020-0087, 2021 WL 1478341 (La. App. 1 Cir. April 16,
2021).
Landowners filed a rule with the district court to show why a rehearing
on proposed production units should not be ordered. The rehearing was to
be before Louisiana’s Commissioner of Conservation. The Commissioner
had previously adopted an oil company’s proposal to create two production
units on the landowners’ property which the landowners opposed. The
landowners had requested a rehearing on the proposal to account for
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additional evidence, but it was denied by the Commissioner. The district
court ordered a rehearing before the Commissioner who upheld the original
order. Subsequently, the landowners timely appealed to the district court to
review the Commissioner’s order. The district court found that the
landowners had been prejudiced by the Commissioner’s order because the
Commissioner’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of
discretion. The district court ordered the Commissioner to adopt the
landowners’ proposed plan. The Commissioner appealed to appellate court.
The Commissioner’s appeal focused on two issues: (1) timeliness of the
landowners’ request to the district court for judicial review and (2) the
district court’s finding that the decision had prejudiced the landowners. The
appellate court held that (1) the landowners’ request for judicial review was
timely and (2) that the Commissioner’s decision was not arbitrary or
capricious or an abuse of discretion. The request was considered timely
because the landowners made it within sixty days of the Commissioner’s
final order. The Commissioner’s decision had a rational basis because
based on the evidence, the Commissioner had determined that a smaller
production unit would not efficiently drain the unit areas. Therefore, the
Commissioner’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of
discretion because the decision had a rational basis. The appellate court
reinstated the Commissioner’s order.
Headington Royalty, Inc. v. Finley Resources, Inc., 623 S.W.3d 480 (Tex.
App. 2021).
Holders of “deep rights” interests in an oil and gas lease sued the recordtitle owner, an oil and gas company, to recover damages caused by the
termination of the lease because of the company’s cessation of production
on the wells. The top lessee intervened on behalf of the record-title owner
because of an indemnification provision in an assignment agreement
between the two. The top lessee argued that the release provision in a swap
acreage agreement between the top lessee and the deep rights holder barred
the claims. The agreement contained a categorical release provision which
waived and released the top lessee’s “predecessors” from liability. The
agreement did not name the record-title owner as a predecessor. All the
parties filed motions for summary judgement. The top lessee and the
record-title owner’s motions were granted by the trial court. The trial court
found that the release provision was unambiguous, and the term
predecessor included predecessors-in-title to the property interest like the
record-title owner. The appellate court disagreed. The appellate court
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reasoned that because of Texas precedent, categorical releases are to be
construed narrowly. Because the term predecessors in the release provision
was in a string that referred to entities that related to the top lessee’s
company like affiliates and shareholders, a narrow reading suggested that it
was meant only to apply to those type of entities—not predecessors in real
property interest. Additionally, the appellate court found that the recordtitle owner was not a third-party beneficiary because the swap acreage
agreement contained no clear or unequivocal language that suggested the
agreement was to benefit the record-title owner. The appellate court
reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case to the trial court.
Louisiana v. Biden, No. 21-CV-00778, 2021 WL 2446010 (W.D. La. June
15, 2021).
Thirteen Plaintiff states (Louisiana, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas,
Utah, and West Virginia) motioned for a preliminary injunction against
Government Defendants regarding implementation of a pause on new oil
and gas leases on public lands and offshore waters (“Pause”) after
Executive Order 14008, signed by President Joseph R. Biden, Jan. 27,
2021. Plaintiff States claimed that the Government Defendants violated the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), therefore entitling them to the
injunction. The Court found that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(“OCSLA”) does not grant specific authority to a President to “Pause”
offshore oil and gas leases, the power to “Pause” lies solely with Congress,
therefore Plaintiff States made a sufficient case that there is a substantial
likelihood that President Biden exceeded his powers under Section 208 of
Executive Order 14008. The Court further held that States had substantial
likelihood of success of their claims that Government Defendants acted in
an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the APA, failed to
comply with APA notice provisions, and unreasonably withheld and
unreasonably delayed agency-required activity in violation of the APA. The
Court held that Plaintiff states demonstrated a substantial threat of
irreparable injury absent preliminary injunction and that balance of equities
and the public’s interest favored issuance of the injunction, and accordingly
granted Plaintiff States' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. This case has
since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of
publication.
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Marker v. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 2:20-cv-00631 MV/KRS, 2021 WL
1207462 (D.N.M. Mar. 31, 2021).
Plaintiff brought this suit against the Department of the Interior, Bureau
of Land Management, Pecos District (BLM); New Mexico Energy Minerals
and Natural Resources, New Mexico Oil Conservation Division (NM
OCD); and New Mexico State Land Office (NM SLO). Plaintiff is the
owner and operator of oil and gas wells on federal and state leases in New
Mexico. Plaintiff brings claims of Fraud, Civil Conspiracy, and Fifth
Amendment Regulatory Takings under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings
and recommended disposition (PFRD) supported granting NM OCD and
NM SLO’s motions for summary judgment. The court adopted the findings
of the PFRD, dismissing the claims against the state defendants without
prejudice, while the claims against the BLM will continue. The first ground
for dismissal was lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To use the FTCA, the
United States must be the defendant. Additionally, § 1983 does not give
jurisdiction for the state defendants but would provide jurisdiction for
individuals working at the state agencies who deprived the plaintiff of his
rights. The individuals named by the plaintiff in his brief did not justify the
naming of NM OCD and NM SLO as defendants. The individuals must be
named in the complaint and tied to specific acts which deprived plaintiff of
his constitutional rights. The second reason for dismissal was for failure to
state a claim of fraud. The court found that the complaint was hypothetical
and conclusory. It also fails the make a claim with any specificity. The
claim of civil conspiracy was likewise conclusory. The claim of regulatory
taking also failed because the plaintiff did not allege that he was prohibited
from use of his property.
Cook v. Cimarex Energy Co., No. 07-19-00099-CV, 2021 WL 1603249
(Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2021).
Lessor brought this suit against the lessee for trespass. The two parties
began to disagree as to the meaning of the contract with regards to the
roads, and lessor refused lessee’s payment. The trial court granted lessee’s
motion for summary judgement, overruling lessor’s objections. The appeal
court reviewed de novo and reversed and remanded the case. Lessee’s
motion for summary judgment attacked the consent element of trespass,
arguing that the contract gave consent for them to use the lessor’s private
road to access their wells. The court looked to the language of the contract
to see if it was unambiguous when referencing the applicable roads. The

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

588

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 7

contract used “road’ and “lease road” without defining either term. The
appeals court found that these terms were ambiguous. The use of extrinsic
evidence also found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to which
road was referenced in the contract. The trial court also erred by granting
summary judgement if it was granted as a result of the lessee’s affirmative
defenses. The first affirmative defense raised was equitable estoppel. This
argument fails because the lessee failed to show that the lessor knowingly
misrepresented a material fact intending for the lessee to act upon it. The
argument of quasi-estoppel fails because the terms of the contract are
ambiguous, and the agreement to use of the private road was not clear if it
was permanent or temporary. Finally, the lessee’s argument of waiver fails
because the contract was not conclusive, so it cannot be said that the lessor
waived his right to eject the lessee. Further, the court ruled that the trial
court abused its evidentiary discretion by sustaining the lessee’s objections
of parol evidence and hearsay. The appeals court instructed the trial court to
reexamine the admissibility of evidence.
Tomechko v. Garrett, 172 N.E.3d 1087 (Ohio App. 7th Dist. 2021), appeal
not allowed, 173 N.E.3d 1230 (Ohio 2021).
Mineral Owner One inherited one-half interest in land. She had it for her
natural life and upon her death, her children would inherit the land. Before
she died, she conveyed the land to Mineral Owner Two but reserved half of
the mineral rights, “EXCEPTING a one-half interest in all mineral rights.”
Mineral Owner Two leased the Oil and Gas rights of the entire property to
Trans-Atlantic Energy on March 8, 1989. In 2013 and 2014, the heirs of
Mineral Owner One leased their Oil and Gas rights that were reserved by
Mineral Owner One to Gulfport Energy Corporation. The Mineral Owner
Two sued and moved for summary judgment. There are two issues—the
word “minerals” and adverse possession. The heirs of Mineral Owner Two
claim “minerals” includes Oil & Gas; Mineral Owner One disagrees. The
court decides that minerals does include Oil & Gas for two reasons. First,
historically Oil & Gas is included as minerals in Ohio. Second, the Court
looks to the surrounding area and asks if Oil & Gas is prevalent. Here, it
was. Next—adverse possession. The trial court split the mineral rights into
two parts: the shallow rights and the deep rights. The deep rights were
everything below the point that Mineral Owner Two had drilled. The Court
overruled this. Because the drilling of the land for Oil & Gas had so altered
and changed the fugacious nature of the land, Mineral Owner Two had
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adversely possessed all minerals and not just up to where they had drilled.
Summary Judgment was granted on adverse possession.
PLC v. Alaska, 484 P.3d 572 (Alaska 2021).
Producer sued Corporation because land they owned a royalty that was
not included in an expansion that was approved by the Department of
Natural Resources. Producer sought a reversal of the Superior Court on
grounds of standing and abuse of discretion. Corporation operates a unit of
land which Producer has a lease on. Corporation submitted a proposal for a
right to expand drilling on more land to the Department of Natural
Resources. The original proposal had 80 acres included in it that PLC had a
lease on. This proposal was denied. Another proposal—that Producer was
not a part of—was approved. The Superior Court held that Producer lacked
Standing. The Supreme Court reversed because Producer had an adequate
personal stake in the proposal. Their personal stake is—they get paid if
they’re land is included. Also, if gas is being produced beneath Producer’s
lease, then it has an interest in realizing profits. The court ruled Producer
had standing and reversed and remanded on these grounds. The abuse of
discretion claim was because an appendix was stuck from the record.
Producer added this appendix because Corporation did not include their
methodology for expanding the acreage in their report. The court held this
is not abuse because “absence of one document from the record does not
give a party the right to attach an entirely different document.” The
Superior Court found no abuse of discretion.
Pogo Res., LLC v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., No. 3:19-CV-2682BH, 2021 WL 1923301 (N.D. Tex. May 13, 2021).
Operator obtained coverage where Insurer would not cover pollution
clean-up costs, pollution injury or damage, or pollution work loss costs.
Operator filed for bankruptcy and the assets and insurance policies were
bought by Developer. Developer assumed all responsibility and liability for
any acts or omissions by Operator. Operator had an oil spill. Insurer stated
they would pay for the incidents. Insurer later sent a letter to Developer
denying coverage for the spill based on the total pollution exclusion that
denied pollution clean-up costs. Developer filed suit in state court, Insurer
removed it to federal court where Developer amended the complaint to
assert new claims. Developer again moved to file a second amended
complaint. The deadline in the scheduling order had expired. Under FRCP
16(b), there are four factors to determine if the movant has shown good
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cause for an untimely motion to amend pleadings: (1) explanation for the
failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2) importance of the
amendment; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the amendment; and (4) the
availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice. The court said the first
factor weighs against granting the motion for leave to amend because a
partial dismissal based on deficient pleading is not an appropriate reason for
not timely moving for leave to amend. The court said the second factor
weighs in favor of granting leave to amend because the Developer would be
foreclosed from pursing important claims at trial without them. The court
said for the third and fourth factors the potential for prejudice is minimal
and the Developer has met the good faith standard. The court granted
Developer’s motion for leave to amend the complaint.
EME Wyoming, LLC v. BRW E., LLC, 486 P.3d 980 (Wyo. 2021).
District Court of Goshen County granted Producer the right to access
52,000 acres of Landowner’s property to survey but restricted them from
using the information to file an application for a permit to drill. The district
court permanently barred Producer from using the information collected to
file APDs. Landowners appealed the access to land and Producers appealed
the restriction of using the information for APDs. Producers on appeal
argued that because they are an oil and gas company, they have the power
to enter the land under Wyoming’s Eminent Domain Act and to use that
information to file APDs. Producer argues that they are a condemner and
that the Act applies to them because of their status in oil and gas
production. The Supreme Court of Wyoming says the power of
condemnation must be narrowly construed and rejects the producer’s
argument. The court said that “only those entities with landlocked mineral
ownership would have the power to condemn under the Eminent Domain
Act.” The court said the Act is not intended to be one where an entity can
obtain access to see if it wants to acquire mineral ownership in that area.
The court said that a condemner must at least show that it owns
development rights to landlocked minerals and the location of those
minerals. Producers did not show they owned the right to develop
landlocked minerals that it could not access without condemning
landowner’s land. The court reversed the first ruling and says that producers
should not be granted access to the property. The court affirmed the order
that producers are barred from using the data to file ADP’s but allow
Producer to use the data to support a condemnation action.
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Midstream
Jeanerette Lumbar & Shingle Co. v. Fla. Gas Transmission Co., 2020-249
(La. App. 3 Cir. 7/14/21); 2021 WL 2946282.
Grantor of pipeline servitudes sued Grantees after their alleged failure to
maintain canals and banks injured surrounding land. Grantor sued under
theories of (1) breach of contract, (2) negligence, (3) nuisance, (4) trespass,
(5) unjust enrichment and (6) unfair trade practices. The agreements
contained indemnity provisions for property damages and arbitration
clauses exempting from the general provision damages to crops, wildlife,
timber, fences, or structures (one grantee omitted “timber” and another
omitted “structures”). The trial court stayed the proceedings against all
Grantees, and compelled arbitration of all claims against two of the three
Grantees. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana reversed the trial court’s
findings, vacated the stay, and remanded for further proceedings based on
several holdings. First, the court requires resolution of doubt as to the scope
of an arbitration clause be in favor of arbitration. Second, staying all claims
against all grantees constituted an abuse of discretion because the nonarbitrable claims could proceed concurrently with arbitration, as is routinely
done. Grantee that omitted the term “structures” is not subject to arbitration
under the provision and should proceed in court. Third, for Grantees that
retained the term “structures,” canals are not structures by definition and are
not arbitrable under the provision. Further, Grantor is not seeking damages
for injuries to the canals themselves. The court reversed the stay and
remanded the non-arbitrable claims for damages to the hydrology,
sedimentology, and ecology of the land, reversed the exceptions of
prematurity as to claims for damages outside the parameters of the
arbitration clause to proceed under the general indemnity provisions, and
compelled arbitration of arbitrable claims for damages to the forest,
wildlife, and flora and fauna.
Kirby Inland Marine v. FPG Shipholding Co., 548 F. Supp. 3d 613 (S.D.
Tex. 2021).
Liquified-gas carrier vessel (“Carrier”) collided with tank barge operator
vessel (“Operator”) causing Operator’s barges to leak reformate into the
bay, resulting in environmental damage. Operator petitioned for
exoneration from liability. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas identified Carrier’s negligence as the sole cause of the
collision. Carrier’s negligence violated the Inland Navigation Rules,
specifically Rules 6, 7, and 9, barring Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”) limits
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from mitigating Carrier’s liability. First, Carrier violated Rule 6 of the
Inland Navigation Rules, which requires vessels to travel at safe speeds,
when it traveled at a speed of 12 knots—4 knots higher than her maximum
safe travel speed—through the channel. Second, Carrier violated Rule 7,
which requires use of all means available to determine risk of collision and
avoid it, when her crew placed her radar and ECDIS on standby, effectively
shutting them down. Third, Carrier violated Rule 9, which requires vessels
to proceed along the outside of a narrow channel, when she crossed over to
the Operator’s side of the channel and again when she sheered back to her
original side after the vessels agreed to switch. OPA generally holds the
owner of the vessel where pollutants spilled from liable for the cost of
removing the oil and damages caused by the spill, but the owner can offload
that liability by demonstrating that the damage was caused solely by
another party. OPA limits the liability of responsible parties based on vessel
size and tonnage, but not where the proximate cause of the incident was in
violation of federal operating regulations. Carrier breached her duty to
Operator in violation of the Inland Navigation Rules. Therefore, Carrier
was solely responsible for the damage caused and OPA liability limits do
not mitigate Carrier’s liability.
In re Matter of Enbridge Energy, LP, 2021 WL 2407855 (Minn. Ct. App.
Jun. 14, 2021).
Applicant is seeking a certificate of need from the Minnesota Public
Utilities Commission to replace its existing pipeline with a new one that
will transport crude oil on a new route across Minnesota. Applicant asserted
that replacing the pipeline would benefit Minnesota and surrounding states
by (1) addressing integrity risks of the pipeline by replacing the pipeline
with one constructed with the latest technology and materials, (2) reduce
apportionment on the Mainline System, and (3) allow applicant to
efficiently operate the Mainline System and reduce power utilization. The
commission favored replacement of the line. The trial court held that the
commission acted arbitrarily in determining the FEIS adequate. The Court
of Appeals of Minnesota determined that the inclusion of the impact of an
oil spill in Lake Superior and how the location was chosen adequately
explains the decision and is acceptable. The trial court held that the relators
did not establish a basis to reverse the commission’s decision to grant a
certificate of need. The appellate court stated that the commission shall
grant a certificate of need if four areas of criteria are met: (1) the probable
result of denial would adversely affect the future adequacy, reliability, or

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss3/5

2022]

Recent Case Decisions

593

efficiency of energy supply too the applicant, (2) a more reasonable and
prudent alternative to the proposed facility has not been demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence, (3) the consequences to society of granting
the certificate of need are more favorable than the consequences of denying,
and (4) it has not been demonstrated on the record that the proposition will
fail to comply with the relevant policies, rules, and regulations. The court
found the criteria was met and determined the certificate is proper.
WATER
Federal
Save the Colorado v. Semonite, No. 18-cv-03258-CMA, 2021 WL 1210374
(D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2021).
Save the Colorado, Wildearth Guardians, Living Rivers, Waterkeeper
Alliance, and Sierra Club (“Petitioners”) are a collection of environmental
groups who sued to block a project proposing reservoir expansion in
Boulder County, Colorado. Respondents are the heads of three Federal
Agencies who approved the process, and Denver Water also intervened as a
Respondent. Denver Water owns and operates the Gross Reservoir at issue,
which collects and stores water for the City of Denver and surrounding
areas under a license issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”). Petitioners claimed that Respondent agencies violated federal
law by improperly granting approval on the reservoir expansion project.
The respondents claimed that the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”)
violated federal law by failing to fully consider the environmental impact of
the reservoir expansion before approving the project and that the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service issued a flawed biological opinion about the impact of
the project. Respondents moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction,
claiming that the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) gives federal courts of
appeals exclusive action over cases involving a FERC licensing
controversy; under 16 U.S.C. § 825/(b). The Court found that when a party
challenges an agency order that is “inextricably linked” to an FERC order,
the FPA’s exclusive jurisdiction provision applies. Finding that the actions
of the Corps and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service were inextricably
intertwined with the FERC’s licensure, the Court ruled that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear this case, and granted Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss.
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State
In re Challenge of Delaware Riverkeeper Network, No. A-0709-19, 2021
WL 2562541 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 23, 2021).
Appellees desired to construct a waterfront dock and “multi-use deepwater port” to expand their ability to receive and load cargo on ships. The
Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) issued a permit after
deciding that the proposed construction satisfied all applicable standards set
forth under the Energy Facility Use rule. Appellants contended that DEP
acted unreasonably in issuing a permit to Appellees under three main
arguments. First, the appellants contend that the dock should have been
evaluated as an “energy facility”. Failure to evaluate under this category
meant that DEP did not have to consider impact upon submerged aquatic
vegetation. The court concluded that because the dock itself did not fit into
any of the 16 categories set forth in N.J.A.C. 7:7-15.4, DEP did not act
erroneously in not evaluating the dock as an “energy facility”. The court
found that there was substantial supporting evidence that the dock would
not present any threat to the existing underwater life. Second, the appellants
argue that DEP did not require enough information from Appellee
regarding potential impacts to water quality. The court found that Appellees
conducted all required pre-dredging chemical testing and that DEP
reviewed and approved of all test results and properly considered any
possible negative impact on water quality. Third, appellants argue that DEP
should have required Appellees to obtain an Industrial Stormwater Permit
under N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.6 because the dock constituted a “major
development”. The court found the dock was not a “major development”
because it did not add more than a quarter-acre of impervious surface and it
did not involve the movement of soil of more than one acre. In conclusion,
the court decided that DEP did not act in an unreasonable manner in issuing
a permit to Appellee. This case is an unpublished case of the court;
therefore, state (or federal) court rules should be consulted before citing the
case as precedent.
Melerine v. Tom’s Marine & Salvage, LLC, 315 So.3d 806 (La. 2021).
Oyster bed lessees sued a tugboat captain’s employer for damages
caused by the captain’s grounding of the tugboat on an oyster bed leased to
the lessees. The lessees retained an oyster biologist to assess the damage
caused by the grounding. The salvage company filed two motions in limine
seeking to exclude evidence based on guidelines by the Oyster Lease
Damage Evaluation Board and the oyster biologist’s testimony on the
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movement of sediment through the oyster bed. Additionally, the salvage
company argued the biologist’s damage calculations were not based on
reliable methodology. The trial court denied both motions and admitted the
evidence. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that denying the motions
was erroneous. The court held that admitting the formulas based on the
board’s guidelines was erroneous because the board’s formulas were
normally used with a pre-project biological survey and a post-project
biological survey. The oyster biologist had not conducted a pre-project
biological survey, only a post-project biological survey. Therefore, the
Court held that because the biologist had not conducted the pre-project
survey, the board’s guidelines were inapplicable. Because the guidelines
were inapplicable, their probative value of the evidence was reduced and
rendered irrelevant and inadmissible. On the biologist’s opinion that the
tugboat’s grounding dispersed sediment that killed the oysters, the Court
held that the evidence should have been excluded because of the biologist’s
own admission that he lacked expertise in sedimentology. For the damages,
the Court held that because the biologist lacked literature or tested scientific
methods to support his testimony for calculating the damages, it also should
have been excluded. The Court reversed, vacated, and remanded the trial
court’s decision.
LAND
Easement
Marcum v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, No. 19-3873, 2021 WL
3033749 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2021).
Landowner sued a pipeline company after stormwater remediation
efforts failed to protect their property from extensive damage. Landowner is
subject to a pipeline easement that has had larger pipelines added after
negotiations. The property is downslope from two other properties, and
during construction of a new pipeline in 2015 the pipeline company
installed temporary erosion and sediment controls. Landowner asserts
claims of: (1) negligent construction and failure to maintain; (2) violation of
the Pennsylvania Storm Water Management Act; (3) nuisance; (4) trespass
to land by alteration of surface and subsurface drainage; and (5) breach of
fiduciary duty. The court considered the pipeline company’s Daubert
motion and the motion for summary judgement. The Daubert motion
challenged the landowner’s expert witness—an engineer who works on
pipeline projects—but failed due to his findings bases on sufficient factual
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foundations and relation to the parties’ fundamental factual disputes.
Additionally, all but one of the claims in the pipeline company’s motion for
summary judgement failed. First, the contract release between the
landowner and pipeline company did not absolve it from liability for postexecution conduct. Second, the statute of limitations of two years only bars
damages incurred before April 5, 2016. Third, the Natural Gas Act does not
field preempt or conflict preempt the state and local stormwater
management laws that required certain steps by the pipeline company.
Fourth, the pipeline company failed to identify a basis for granting
summary judgment on the landowner’s nuisance and trespass claims. Fifth,
a reasonable jury could find that the pipeline company was negligent in
failing to implement adequate stormwater management measures. Lastly,
however, the landowner’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty failed because
there was no creation of a fiduciary duty between the landowner and
pipeline company.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534
(FEB), 2021 WL 2036662 (D.D.C. May 21, 2021).
Tribes sued U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“USACE”) after it granted
Dakota Access, LLP, (“Company”) an easement to install a pipeline under a
lake, near which the Tribes live, without first producing an Environmental
Impact Statement. The district court ruled in favor of the Tribes by vacating
the easement, which the appellate court affirmed, as the pipeline ran
through federal land. The appellate court, however, reversed the district
court’s order to empty the oil from the pipeline, reasoning that the district
court must first find that an injunction to empty the pipeline was necessary
to prevent “irreparable harm” to the Tribes. On remand, the district court
declined to grant the injunction due to the Tribes’ failure to prove that such
harm was imminent and likely. Ultimately, the Tribes did not prove the
likelihood of an oil spill from the pipeline contaminating the lake on which
they rely. Thus, the threat of an oil spill was not sufficient to satisfy the
necessary factor for injunctive relief of “irreparable harm” to the Tribes’
water source. Likewise, the Tribes did not show how the flow of oil through
federal land directly threatened their rights or sovereignty. The court denied
not only the Tribes’ motion for an injunction but also their motion for
clarification regarding whether the court vacated Company’s permit to
install the pipeline as granting the latter motion would not directly result in
the relief the Tribes’ requested.
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Other Use
Lexington Land Dev., L.L.C. v. Chevron Pipeline Co., 2020 CA 0622, 2021
WL 2102932 (La. App. 1 Cir. May 25, 2021).
Development Company sued Pipeline Company for damages under a
theory of negligence after a pipeline leaked on Development Company’s
property. The trial court ruled in favor of Pipeline Company by granting
partial summary judgment and dismissing certain claims due to
Development Company’s inability to prove damages to the two tracts and
the lack of privity of contract between the parties. Thereafter, Development
Company acquired assignments of rights as an owner and amended its
pleading, and Pipeline Company responded by filing a peremptory
prescription of exemption to dismiss the claims regarding damages of
which Development Company had knowledge longer than the period
necessary for Pipeline Company to gain prescription. Development
Company appealed after the trial court granted Pipeline Company’s
prescription, dismissed all claims in the suit, and denied Development
Company’s motion for a new trial. The appellate court, however, declined
to rule on the issue of the prescription as it determined that it was an
interlocutory, rather than a final, judgment. Moreover, the appellate court
held that, because the mineral lease expired before the assignment of rights,
Development Company did not have standing to sue. Thus, the court
affirmed the trial court’s judgment, thereby maintaining partial summary
judgment and the dismissal of Development Company’s claims.
Brown v. Cont’l Res., Inc., No. 5:18-CV-05048-KES, 2021 WL 1192615
(Mar. 30, 2021).
Grantors sued Grantee for alleged damage to Grantors’ surface and
subsurface estate. Grantee removed the case to federal court under diversity
jurisdiction. The court reviewed substantive issues in accordance with state
law. Grantors sued Grantee under South Dakota Codified Law chapter 455A. Section 45-5A-4 instructs developers to pay owners for damages
sustained by “loss of agricultural production, lost land value, and lost value
of improvements caused by mineral development.” Grantors sought
damages for two claims. First, Grantors alleged that Grantee’s high volume
of truck traffic created dust, which rendered the pasture useless for twenty
grazing months. Second, Grantors sought damages for Grantee’s occupation
of subsurface pore space beneath Grantors’ land, which resulted from the
injection and removal of saltwater beneath a well. Grantee responded the
2010 Surface Use Drilling Agreement and 2010 Pipeline Agreement
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released it from alleged surface damage. First, the plain language of the
Surface Use Drilling Agreement released Grantee from “any and all surface
damages.” Grantors claimed the contract did not include the specific
surface damage claim; however, the court noted the release stated,
“including but not limited to drilling and completing the Well.” The court
rejected the Grantors’ interpretation, and confirmed the illustrative
language was not intended to be complete. Second, the 2010 Pipeline
Agreement mirrored the first agreement’s plain language and gave the
Grantee an unambiguous release from “any and all surface damages.” The
release section also included an illustrative list of damages that was not
complete in nature. The court held the unambiguous language in both
agreements released Grantee from “any and all surface damages” including
the surface damage claim. The court granted Grantors’ motion finding
Grantors served responses to Grantee’s requests for admission. The court
granted Grantee’s motion for partial summary judgment.
ELECTRICITY
Traditional Generation
In Re Empire District Elec. Co., 2021 WL 3159769 (Mo. Ct. App. July 27,
2021).
The Empire District Electric Company (Empire) is an electrical
corporation providing public utilities and regulated by the Public Service
Commission (“Commission”). The Office of Public Counsel (“OPC”) and
Empire appealed an order and decision from the Commission concerning
the historical financial impact of Empire’s ownership and operation of
“Asbury” coal-fired electricity plant, and the Commission’s refusal to use
Empire’s capital structure to calculate rates, respectively. OPC’s point of
appeal was denied. The Commission considered the historical financial
impact of Asbury, because the “true-up” period following a test year
purports to balance historical data with future changes. In deciding whether
to include a post-year event, the Commission considers “whether the
proposed adjustment is: (1) known and measurable, (2) promotes the proper
relationship of investment, revenues, and expenses, and (3) is representative
of the conditions anticipated during the time the rates will be in effect.” The
Commission reasonably found that the effects of Asbury’s retirement were
not known or measurable at the time the rates were calculated, as the
facilities were potentially useful after its retirement, thus making ongoing
expenses incalculable. In addition, the Commission’s use of the accounting
authority order (AAO) was a lawful and reasonable way to consider
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implications of Asbury’s retirement. Empire’s point of appeal was also
denied. The Commission had considerable discretion in setting rates and
was able to determine reasonable and just rates by creating a hypothetical
capital structure. The United States Supreme Court has instructed not to
interfere with the Commission’s rates unless they are outside of the “zone
of reasonableness,” or “within a percentage point of the national average for
similar utilities.” This zone of reasonableness was satisfied. The Missouri
Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Commission.
Renewable Generation
Va. Elec. and Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 861 S.E.2d 47 (Va. 2021).
Constellation NewEnergy, Inc. (“Constellation”) is a service provider for
a retail choice program under Code § 56-576(A)(5), which offers electric
energy that is 100% renewable. The Code lays out the definitional
requirement for “renewable energy” as, among other things, “derived from .
. . falling water.” Constellation utilizes a pumped storage hydroelectricity
facility to generate electricity. The Code was revised in 2020, after
contracts were made between Constellation and the Virginia Electric and
Power Company (“VEPCO”) in 2019. The revised language of the Code
explicitly excluded pumped storage from the definition of “renewable
energy.” VEPCO contested Constellation’s use of pumped storage and
contended that the amended code be applied retroactively to the parties’
agreement. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that pumped storage fell
under the definition of “renewable energy” in the Code and refused to
retroactively apply the amended code to the 2019 contracts. The court
reasoned that the plain language of the Code did not indicate a narrow
interpretation of falling water based on method of production, but instead
was based on the original source of the energy. The amended code also did
not expressly claim to clarify the existing code, and instead expressly
excluded pumped storage from the definition in the amendment.
Furthermore, the amendment did not suggest a legislative intent to change
the substantive rights of the contracting parties by retroactively applying the
amended definition, and there was likewise no future performance
obligation applied to existing contracts, as the parties have a vested interest
in the terms of the existing contractual obligations. Since there was no
legislative intent to affect existing contracts and no dispute between those
rights and the amendment, the police power of the state is not imposed upon
the existing contracts involving private agreements under the retail choice
scheme.
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Fisheries Survival Fund v. Haaland, No. 20-5094, 2021 WL 2206426 (D.C.
Cir. May 20, 2021).
Appellants were organizations of fishermen and seaside municipalities
who sued Secretary of the Interior, Deb Haaland, under the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (“OCSLA”), challenging the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management's (“BOEM”) decision to issue an offshore lease for a
windfarm off the coast of New York. The district court dismissed the
fishermen’s claims as unripe and for failure to comply with the OSCL’s
pre-suit notice provision. The Court affirmed that the lease in this case did
not trigger the necessary NEPA obligations, upholding the district court
ruling regarding ripeness. The Court further held that Appellants’ case did
not comply with the sixty-day waiting period outlined in OSCLA, and
therefore affirmed the faulty notice finding of the lower court. The Court
ordered that the judgment of the district court be affirmed. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state (or federal) court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
In re Hawai’ian Elec. Co., Inc., 149 Hawai‘i 343, 489 P.3d 1255 (Haw.
2021).
An Environmental Agency (“Agency”) sought review of the Public
Utilities Commission’s (“Commission”) denial of Agency’s Motion for
Relief from a 2014 Order issued by Commission (“Order No. 32600”)
where they approved an Electric Company’s (“Company”) agreement to
purchase wind energy generated by a Wind Energy Company (“WEC”). In
2019, Agency filed a Motion for Relief from Order 32600 alleging it was
void under Hawai‘i Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) (“Rule 60(b)”)
because WEC obtained an incidental take license (“ITL”) after the deadline
in the Purchase Power Agreement (“PPA”), Commission failed to consider
GHG emissions, and the price of wind energy was unreasonable, stating
these issues were not apparent in the original appeal timeframe, among
other allegations. Commission denied Agency’s motion, stating
Commission lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion because Agency
failed to file a timely appeal. Agency appealed to the Supreme Court of
Hawai‘i, and Company filed a Statement Contesting Jurisdiction, stating
court lacked jurisdiction because of Agency’s delayed filing. The Court
held that it did have jurisdiction to consider whether Rule 60(b) provides
authority to re-open agency proceedings due to changed circumstances. The
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Court stated that Commission “has the discretion, but is not required,” to
consider Hawai’i’s Rules of Civil Procedure where the Commission’s rules
are silent, and that Commission did not abuse its discretion in declining to
re-open Order No. 32600 under Rule 60(b) because: (1) the absence of a
GHG emissions analysis is evident on the face of Order 32600,
(2) because an ITL is a Governmental Approval and there is no provision to
void the PPA due to a late Government Approval (the parties were not late
in obtaining the ITL), and (3) the blog article about decreased wind energy
did not warrant a reopening because it did not demonstrate the
“extraordinary circumstances” required.
Town of Sudbury v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 169 N.E.3d 1157 (Mass.
2021).
Town petitioned for review of Energy Facilities Siting Board’s
(“Board”) decision to approve an electric company’s proposal to construct a
new electrical transmission line and denying its motion to reopen the
administrative record. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
that boards receive a great amount of deference in deciding whether to
reopen an administrative record, and that this Board did not err when it
considered material provided by both parties in determining not to reopen
the record because it found that the additional information Town sought to
introduce would have no impact on its decision. Additionally, Town failed
to establish that Board did not satisfy its statutorily identified objectives in
permitting projects: (1) to provide a reliable energy source, (2) with a
minimum impact on the environment, and (3) at the lowest possible cost.
The court held that Town misunderstood the implications of Board’s duty
by arguing that Board erroneously approved the proposal because it did not
have the lowest cost or least environmental impact of all available
alternatives. Instead, these three considerations are mere factors that, when
balanced, are intended to guide administrative decision-making. First,
Board determined the project would provide a reliable and necessary energy
source by identifying contingencies in the forecast data that suggested
thermal overloads and low voltage violations would pose a risk to more
than 72,000 customers. Second, Board weighed environmental impacts of
this project against other available alternatives and ultimately determined
that the route it chose was comparable in environmental impact to the other
alternative routes. Finally, Board considered cost by relying on conceptual
cost estimates in comparing the approved project with possible alternatives
and was not obligation to select the cheapest one. In conclusion, the court
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upheld Board’s decisions to approve the new transmission line project and
deny Town’s motion to reopen the administrative record.
TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS
Bankruptcy
In re Fieldwood Energy LLC, No. 20-33948, 2021 WL 2853151 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. June 25, 2021).
Production Company’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan was approved in
whole by the court. The plan approved was a Credit Bid Purchase
Agreement. Production Company gave some of their offshore well assets to
a group of creditors along with a payment of cash, in exchange for debt
forgiveness. This move assisted with the cost of plugging and responsibly
abandoning their offshore wells. Production Company will now restructure
via a divisive merger into separate, specialized entities. The final order and
subsequent executing of the plan does not impact any other current
litigation that has been filed against Production Company.
In re MTE Holding LLC, 2021 WL 2258270 (Bankr. D. Del. June 2, 2021).
Debtor is an oil & gas drilling business that generated wastewater as a
byproduct, for which Debtor retained a Title Company (“Company”) to
conduct title and right-of-way research for Debtor’s wastewater disposal
project. Company provided services before and after Debtor filed for
bankruptcy, at which time Company was instructed it would be paid
through a separate entity owned by Debtor’s CEO (“CEO”). However, CEO
failed to make payment and Company sued seeking the court to allow an
administrative claim on Debtor estate under section 503(b)(1)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code and for immediate payment of debt. Court noted that
Company was entitled to an administrative claim if “(1) there was a postpetition transaction between claimant and the estate and (2) those expenses
yielded a benefit to the estate.” In application, the court stated that the
benefit to the estate needed to be “actual” and “necessary,” but a third-party
non-insider creditor did not become a guarantor of success. A creditor that
provided “post-petition goods or services” to a debtor, did not become “a
guarantor of the success of the venture for which the debtor obtained those
goods and services.” Simply, providing the goods and services meets the
creditors’ burden and shows entitlement to payment. So, if a debtor fails to
make such payment, the debtor breaches the contract, and the damages
arising out the breach constitute an administrative expense. The fact that
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Company subsequently issued invoices to CEO does not relieve Debtor’s
obligation because there was no contractual meeting of the minds to form a
separate contract between CEO and Company. Since Company delivered its
services, the court granted Company’s motion to allow an administrative
claim. Court denied without prejudice Company’s motion for immediate
payment but stated Company could renew the motion if the administrative
claim was not paid within 60 days.
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Federal
Growth Energy v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 5 F.4th 1 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
The Renewable Fuel Standard program sets annual targets for renewable
fuel volumes in the United States. EPA implements these targets and has
discretion to lower them. Three groups filed petitions for review of EPA's
2019 rule. The first group (“renewable producers”) argued that EPA's
required volumes were too low because they failed to adjust annual targets
to account for small refinery exemptions. The District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals held that judicial review of this issue was barred due to a
statute of limitations. The second group (“obliged parties”) argued that the
required volumes were too high because (1) there were severe economic
harms that warranted waivers to refiners, (2) EPA's required volume was
unreasonably attainable, (3) EPA's decision not to oblige fuel blenders was
an abuse of discretion, and (4) EPA's failure to conduct analysis on the
effects of the rule was an abuse of discretion. The court rejected all
arguments made by obliged parties, holding that (1) EPA's decisions were
reasonable, (2) EPA was not required to reconsider its policies on a yearly
basis, (3) including fuel blenders would cause an unnecessary increase the
complexity of the program, and (4) obliged parties failed to raise their
analysis argument within a timely manner. The third group (“environmental
organizations”) argued that EPA's statement that the rule would have no
effect on endangered species, along with its decision not to reduce volumes
to prevent significant environmental harm, were arbitrary and inconsistent.
The court agreed with these points, finding that EPA failed to consult
proper organizations before publicizing the rule, and that the rule was
contrary to the weight of evidence. Accordingly, the court issued a remand
without vacatur of the 2019 rule for EPA to revisit its decision not to
exercise a waiver for severe environmental harm.
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Friends of Animals v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 18-2029, 2021 WL
2935900 (D.D.C. July 13, 2021).
An advocacy group sought a preliminary injunction from the U.S.
District Court, District of Columbia, to block the gather of wild horses
during a drought by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) from the
Onaqui Mountain Herd Management Area in Utah. The advocacy group
alleged that the BLM: (1) violated the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and
Burros Act (WHA) by making long-term removal decisions; (2) violated
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by “departing from agency
guidelines” and not explaining the departure; (3) violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to prepare an environmental
impact statement (EIS); and (4) violated the NEPA by not taking a “hard
look” at their proposed actions. The trial court denied the motion and
addressed each of the advocacy group’s allegations. First, the advocacy
group failed to carry the burden of demonstrating that it will succeed on the
merits in its claim that the BLM violated the WHA. The court limited the
analysis to the prior December 2018 actions because the advocacy group
did not amend or supplement its complaint to challenge the BLM’s current
plan. Therefore, under the current record, the court was also unpersuaded
that the advocacy group will succeed in showing the unlawfulness or
unreasonableness of the BLM’s authorization of gathers over a period of 30
months. Second, the APA claims were not considered because the record
was not supplemented since the prior consideration of the issue. Lastly, the
advocacy group’s NEPA claims did not persuade the court, because the
2018 environmental assessment met the requirements laid out by prior
caselaw, and the court did not believe that the advocacy group will succeed
on the merits of its challenge to the “hard look” the court took in December
2018 at the long-term consequences of the gathers.
Clean Air Council v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 20-2215, 2021 WL 3045927 (3d
Cir. July 20, 2021).
Environmental watchdog sued a manufacturer for not reporting
emissions to the federal government under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA). The district court dismissed the action, and the watchdog
appealed to the Third Circuit. The manufacturer released pollutants into the
air due to a fire that shut down control rooms that clean raw coke-oven gas
from the production of steel. The emissions were reported to the Allegheny
County Health Department as required by Pennsylvania, consistent with the
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Clean Air Act that allows states to regulate enforcement of emissions
targets. CERCLA does not require federally permitted emissions subject to
a state’s implementation of the Clean Air Act from being reported.
However, the watchdog claimed that the emissions were not “federally
permitted releases” under CERCLA and not “subject to” relevant permits
because they violated each plant’s Title V permit, and therefore had to also
be reported to the federal government. The court disagreed with the
watchdog’s definition of “subject to” under CERCLA, holding that
Congress has defined it as “governed or affected by”, not “obedient to” as
claimed by the watchdog. The court reasoned that: (1) Congress
differentiated between “subject to” and “comply with” in CERCLA so they
cannot mean the same thing; (2) reading “subject to” to mean “governed by
or affected by” makes logical sense; (3) vague legislative history cannot
cloud clear statutory text; and (4) deference is not needed to the executive
branch’s early 1990s reading that “subject to” is ambiguous, because
deference is only needed when there is an unresolved ambiguity that does
not exist in the current case. Furthermore, the watchdog conceded in
documents attached to the complaint that each type of gas that was released
was covered by federal permits.
State v. Biden, 338 F.R.D. 219, 109 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1170 (W.D. La. 2021).
A group of thirteen states (“States”), sought declaratory and injunctive
relief regarding Section 208 of Executive Order No. 14008, which ordered
a pause on new oil and gas leases on federal lands and waters. States
alleged the Executive Order violated the United States Constitution, the
Administrative Procedures Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and
the Mineral Leasing Act. States then sought preliminary injunction to
Government’s Executive Order. Conservation Groups (“Groups”), which
consisted of multiple environmentalist organizations, filed a motion to
intervene, attempting to establish Intervention of Right. An intervenor must
show that their interests may not otherwise be adequately represented by
existing parties. Groups asserted that their interests and Government’s
interests differ. Thus, their interest may not be adequately represented.
Further, Groups argued the Government’s “ultimate objective” is to block
States from compelling lease sales. While their “ultimate objective” was to
ensure proper environmental protections were implemented before new
leases were permitted. States contended that Groups and Government’s
“ultimate objective” was the same, to halt leasing on federal lands and
waters. States then argued that because the “ultimate objective” of Groups

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

606

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 7

and Government is the same, there is a presumption of adequacy. The court
held Groups had the same “ultimate objective” as Government. Although
Groups’ interests differed from Government’s, the case was only about
Government’s authority to enact the executive order. Thus, Groups’ effort
to distinguish their “ultimate objective” on environmental grounds failed.
Thus, the presumption of adequacy applied. Groups was unable to rebut the
presumption. Therefore, Groups’ motion to intervene was denied.
Env’t Def. Fund v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 2 F.4th 953 (D.C. Cir.
2021).
The Federal Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) granted Spire STL
(“Spire”) a certificate of public convenience and necessity (“Certificate”),
authorizing Spire to build a natural gas pipeline. The Environmental
Defense Fund (“EDF”) challenged the grant, pointing to the fact that all
parties conceded that no market need justified the grant. In the subsequent
hearing, FERC rejected the challenge reasoning that Spire’s affiliate
precedent agreement proved market need. EDF sued, asserting that FERC’s
decision to grant a “Certificate” to Spire was arbitrary and capricious
because FERC relied solely on Spire’s affiliate precedent agreement in its
determination. Spire and its affiliate intervened in the suit. In granting a
Certificate, FERC must find that there is a market need for the construction
permitted by the Certificate. Then FERC must examine the likelihood of
any adverse impacts arising from a new pipeline. Finally, FERC must
balance any adverse impacts against the construction’s public benefits.
FERC and Spire argued that precedent agreements are generally sufficient
evidence of market need and affiliated precedent agreements should have
the same value as unaffiliated agreements. The court disagreed, pointing out
FERC and Spire’s lack of support in case law. Further, the court found lack
of support for market need or public benefit to justify FERC’s granting of
the Certificate. In determining whether to vacate the granted Certificate, the
court considered the decision’s deficiencies and the disruptive
consequences of vacating. The Certificate was determined severely
deficient, resting almost solely on the affiliate precedent agreement. The
pipeline was operational; thus, disruption would occur upon vacating the
Certificate. However, the court reasoned the former factor sufficiently
outweighed the latter. The court vacated the decision to grant the Certificate
and remanded to FERC for further proceedings.
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Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 997 F.3d 395 (1st Cir. 2021).
An environmental organization appealed the district court’s denial of
preliminary injunctive relief that sought to prevent the United States Army
Corps of Engineers’ (the “Corps”) involvement in the construction of a
segment of an electric transmission power corridor. The construction of the
corridor requires the temporary filling of wetlands, permanent filling of
wetlands, and construction of a tunnel under the Kennebec River. The
Corps is involved as the permitting agency for these construction activities
under the Clean Water Act and the River and Harbors Act. The National
Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”) is a procedural statute that
requires the Corps to consider the environmental impact of permitting these
activities. The Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) implements
NEPA regulations. Two CEQ and Corps regulations are relevant here. First,
NEPA applies only to “major federal actions.” Under 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
The Corps identifies four “typical factors to be considered in determining
whether sufficient ‘control and responsibility’ exists” requiring NEPA
review beyond the “impacts of the specific activity requiring a [Corps]
permit.” Weighing the factors relevant to this case, the Corps found the
activities requiring the Corps’ permit comprised 1.9% of the total corridor
project and the court agreed that the Corps’ involvement did not amount to
a “substantial portion” to warrant analysis of the entire project. Second,
CEQ regulations require an environmental assessment (“EA”) which briefly
provides evidence whether further environmental analyses are necessary.
The Corps conducted a comprehensive EA for the activities that fell within
its jurisdiction and found no significant environmental impacts. The court
found the Corps’ actions insufficiently controversial to warrant further
study. Further, the court disagreed with the environmental organization’s
argument that the Corps provided inadequate opportunities for notice and
comment. The First Circuit held with the Corps and affirmed the district
court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief.
Wild Virginia v. Council on Env’t Quality, No. 3:20CV00045, 2021 WL
2521561 (W.D. Va. June 21, 2021).
Various environmental groups (“Plaintiffs”) brought suit against the
Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) under the Administrative
Procedure Act. The groups challenged the CEQ’s revision of regulations
that are used when implementing the National Environmental Policy Act,
following a defective notice-and-comment rule making process. Plaintiffs
raised three issues. First, the court found that the plaintiffs’ claims were not
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justiciable because the claims were not ripe, and a decision could result in
premature adjudication. The court reasoned that the potential outcomes of
the regulatory changes were too speculative, and it would not be able to
fully consider how the changes would impact the plaintiffs. The court also
found that the claims were not justiciable because the plaintiffs’ complaints
were insufficient to claim standing under Article III. The court reasoned
that the alleged harm to the plaintiffs was too speculative and also that they
did not establish that the revised regulation had caused or would
imminently cause them concrete injury. The court dismissed the case
without prejudice. The case has been appealed since its decision.
WildEarth Guardians v. Steele, No. CV 19-56-M-DWM, 2021 WL
2590143 (D. Mont. June 24, 2021).
This case involved the Flathead National Forest which is a habitat for
grizzly bears and bull trout. Plaintiffs are environmental organizations
which challenged the plans and decisions made by the United States Forest
Service and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service regarding future
plans for the forest. Plaintiffs raise four claims: (1) a road density violation
under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”); (2) a culvert based
NEPA violation; (3) a violation under the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”), based on road density and other winterized motor travel; and (4) a
violation of the Travel Management Rule. The Administrative Procedures
Act was controlling in this case and provided that any arbitrary abuse of
discretion by an agency is against the law. Regarding the first and second
claims, the court found that the Forest Service followed NEPA procedures
fully and fulfilled the “hard look” obligation set out by NEPA in
considering all foreseeable and direct impacts to the forest; therefore,
Plaintiffs’ first two claims fail. Regarding the third claim, the court found
that the Forest Service violated the ESA because it relied on flawed road
reclamation determinations and road density surrogate. Regarding the
fourth claim, the court found that the Forest Service’s interpretation of a
certain executive order was reasonable and therefore the Plaintiffs’
argument was unpersuasive. Additionally, plaintiffs were unable to present
any specific instances where the Forest Service violated the Travel
Management Rule. The court ordered that the provisions that violated the
ESA be remanded without vacatur, to the agencies, for a consideration that
would be consistent with the opinion.
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Cook Inletkeeper v. Raimondo, No. 3:19-cv-00238-SLG, 2021 WL
2169476 (D. Alaska May 27, 2021).
The district court previously ruled in favor of Cook Inletkeeper by
declaring the Incidental Take Regulations (“ITR”), Biological Opinion
(“BiOp”), Environmental Assessment/Finding of No Significant Impact
(“EA/FONSI”), which National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) issued
for Hilcorp Alaska, LLC, (“Company”), to be unlawful due to the failure to
sufficiently consider the impact of noise from Company’s tugs on beluga
whales in Cook Inlet. As a consequence of this ruling, the court ordered the
parties to present briefs to aid its determination of whether vacatur is the
proper remedy for the violations of environmental law. Although the
insufficient consideration severely impacted the accuracy of the ITR, BiOp,
and EA/FONSI, the court concluded that vacatur of all the documents was
not proper as the violations did not affect the entirety of Company’s
activities. Furthermore, such vacatur could cause more harm than it would
prevent as it would keep Company from performing necessary maintenance
unrelated to tugs, which could result in harmful oil spills or gas leaks.
Additionally, Company planned to implement mitigation measures that
rendered complete vacatur unnecessary. Therefore, while the court ordered
vacatur of the documents regarding Company’s use of tugs for most of its
oil production and exploration projects as well as implementation of
Company’s planned mitigation measures, the court declined to completely
vacate, and instead remanded, the documents in regards to Company’s other
activities and a certain upcoming production project.
HollyFrontier Cheyenne Ref., LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 141 S.Ct.
2172 (U.S. 2021).
Congress created the renewable fuel program (“RFP”) to require
domestic refineries to blend renewable fuels with transportation fuels but
provided exemptions to small refineries to lessen the impact of the mandate.
Congress further allowed EPA to extend the exemption for at least two
years if the RFP obligations imposed disproportionate hardships on small
refineries and offered “an extension of the exemption . . .” Three small
refineries initially received an exemption which lapsed for a period and
then sought another exemption. A group of renewable fuel producers
(Respondents) petitioned for review of EPA's decisions, alleging EPA acted
in excess of their power by granting these petitions. The Tenth Circuit
vacated EPA's decisions, stating the refineries were ineligible for the
extension because all three had allowed their exemptions to lapse in the

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

610

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 7

past. The Court looked to define the word “extension” to determine whether
a small refinery that complies with RFP is forbidden from applying for
another “extension” due to a previous lapse. The Court agrees that
“extension” is used in a temporal sense but does not impose a continuity
requirement. Rather, statutorily Congress did not add modifying language,
such as “consecutive” or “successive” extension to the statute, so naturally
“extension” of time can occur even after some lapse. The Court stated that
Respondents could not show that the extension requests were in excess of
EPA’s statutory authority. In the Dissent, Justice Barrett, joined by Justice
Sotomayor and Justice Kagan, argued that the text of the statute allows
EPA to extend the exemption, but EPA cannot extend an exemption that a
refinery no longer has, as the word extension does not imply after lapsed
time.
Western Watersheds Project v. Bernhardt, No.: 1:18-cv-00187-REB, 2021
WL 2366092 (D. Idaho Jun 9, 2021).
An administrative agency conducted a competitive oil and gas lease sale,
which is one of the greatest threats to greater sage-grouse populations,
which sit at 10% of its historical levels. Watershed Project (“Plaintiffs”)
argued that the Phase Two lease sales should be vacated because they
violated NEPA in that Administrative Agency (1) failed to consider the
reasonable alternative of deferring priority greater sage-grouse habitat; (2)
failed to consider the direct and indirect damages of greater sage-grouse by
(a) failing to establish baseline conditions, and (b) failed to identify sitespecific impact; and (3) failed to consider the cumulative impact on greater
sage-grouse. As to (1), the court agreed with Watershed Project that the
Agency violated NEPA standards, as they did not adequately explain why
Plaintiff’s proposed alternatives were subsumed. The court also agreed with
Watershed Project as to (2)(a) and (b), holding that the sources of
information used for baseline analysis were inadequate and that agency
could have analyzed in greater detail the site-specific impact of lease sales
on greater sage-grouse. Finally, the court also agreed with Watershed
Project as to (3), holding that the sources used for cumulative analyses
(EAs and RMP EISs) did not contain quantified assessments of Phase Two
lease sales. However, the court declined to vacate the Phase Two lease sales
as vacatur is not required when a flawed action can remain in place while
an agency seeks to redress its wrongdoing through other measures. Instead,
the court enjoined the Agency from issuing any more APDs for Phase Two
leases, and any further activities which would disturb surface-level estates.
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The court also remanded the EAs to BLM to revise as necessary. Therefore,
the court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgement.
Center for Biological Diversity v. Haaland, No.19-35981, 2021 WL
2232487 (9th Cir. Jun. 3, 2021).
An environmental organization sought review of an administrative
agency’s (“Defendant’s”) reversal in 2017 of its 2011 decision to include
pacific walruses as an endangered or threatened species under the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). The United States District Court of
Alaska granted summary review for the agency. The ESA directs the
Secretary of the Interior to maintain a list of species qualified for
protection. The original decision by Agency to classify the pacific walrus as
endangered listed three reasons: (1) the loss of sea-ice forced the walrus to
retreat to dangerous concentrations on land; (2) subsistence hunting
threatened their numbers; and (3) efforts to decrease greenhouse gas
emissions were not adequate to mitigate these dangers even at their lowered
population levels. Later, an assessment by the review team determined that
the pacific walrus was adapting to its changing environment, leading to the
Agency in 2017 to reverse their prior decision. The appellate court held that
the Agency did not offer a reasoned explanation for its change in position
by examining its own publication alone (not the reasons which the district
court offered as possibilities). The appellate court reversed the district court
decision and remanded for the Agency to provide a sufficient explanation
of its 2017 decision.
Yaw v. Delaware River Basin Comm., No.2:21-cv-00119, 2021 WL
2400765 (E.D Penn. Jun. 11, 2021).
Two members of the Pennsylvania Senate, their party caucus, two
townships and two counties brought action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
These parties alleged: that a 2009 moratorium exceeded authority; was an
unconstitutional taking; was an illegal usurpation of Eminent Domain; and
violated constitutional republican guarantees. The Delaware River Basin
Commission filed motions to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiffs lacked
standing and failed to bring forth viable claims. The court agreed that the
legislator plaintiff parties failed to show proper standing for the court to
grant redress. First, federal courts hold that Legislator-Plaintiffs cannot, on
their own behalf, bring suit for an institutional injury (harms which
constitute some injury to the legislature’s power as a whole, not to the
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individual legislator). The institutional injuries alleged included the
usurpation of legislative authority of the General Assembly to enact laws
with state-wide application: specifically including the power to suspend
eminent domain. Furthermore, the legislators did not claim to stand on
behalf of the Commonwealth, who they claim suffered injury. The
legislators also failed to properly invoke inapposite authority because they
did not identify a specific legislative act that would have been passed but
for the Moratorium nullifying their voices. Finally, the legislators offered
two theories that granted standing outside of Article III: Pennsylvanian
courts granted standing through common law, and their role as trustees of
the Pennsylvanian Environmental Rights Amendment created standing. The
court was not persuaded by either of these theories, and instead determined
that the legislator’s inability to create standing confirmed the dispute to be
partisan in nature and best sorted out through the political process. The
court granted Delaware River Basin’s motion to dismiss.
N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v. FERC, 991 F.3d 439 (2d Cir.
2021).
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”)
petitioned the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for review of orders by
Federal Energy Regulation Commission (“FERC”). In the orders, FERC
determined that DEC missed the one year deadline to deny a certification
request, and therefore waived its authority under Section 401 of the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”). The appellate court denied the petition for review
based on four holdings. First, the appellate court confirmed jurisdiction to
review the petitions. DEC made a timely request to seek appellate review
pursuant to the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”). Second, the appellate court
rejected DEC’s claim that its certification denial was timely because it
entered an agreement to extend the deadline with the natural gas company
(“Company”). The appellate court analyzed legislative history and
confirmed Congress made the bright-line deadline to limit state discretion
and prevent potential regulatory abuse. Therefore, CWA’s one year
deadline precluded the agreement. Third, the appellate court held equitable
principles raised by DEC did not impact FERC’s ability to review the
waiver issue. Pursuant to NGA, FERC had broad discretion to address the
waiver sua sponte or at the request of a third party. Fourth, the appellate
court held FERC reasonably treated Company’s waiver determination
request, because NGA gives FERC broad discretion in its own regulation.
FERC gave a reasonable interpretation of NGA and FERC had a legitimate
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policy reason to review the waiver determination request. The appellate
court denied the petition for review.
City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021).
The City of New York (“City”) sued several multinational oil companies
(“Companies”) and sought damages for global greenhouse gas emissions.
City’s claims arose under a state nuisance law and City sued under theories
of (1) public nuisance, (2) private nuisance, and (3) trespass. The district
court granted Companies’ motions to dismiss and dismissed the complaint
with prejudice. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the district court based on four holdings. First, the appellate court held
that federal common law displaced City’s state law claims. The appellate
court noted precedents applied federal law to issues involving interstate
pollution. Further, the precedents often touched on two federal interests: (1)
uniform decisions for national energy and environmental policy and (2)
federalism. City’s requested damages award would control Companies’
behavior beyond state borders, without considering the laws of surrounding
states. Second, the appellate court held that the Clean Air Act (“CAA”)
displaced the federal common law claims regarding domestic greenhouse
emissions. Since City’s requested damages would serve as a form of
regulation, and Congress passed CAA to directly regulate emissions, CAA
barred City’s claims. The appellate court asserted it may not provide an
alternative regulation that would conflict with Congress. Third, the
appellate court held CAA cannot regulate foreign emissions. CAA only
permitted City to create limited emissions standards within the scope of
state common law. City sought to apply its regulations on emissions that
sourced from other states and countries. Fourth, the appellate court held that
City’s suit targeting emissions beyond the country’s jurisdiction would
impede foreign policy goals. The court noted judicial caution due to
Congress’ interest in handling delicate international policy issues. The
appellate court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
American Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 3 F.4th 373
(D.C. Cir. 2021).
Petroleum industry, ethanol industry, and petroleum retailers challenged
EPA’s decision to grant a fuel volatility waiver to fuel blends containing
gasoline and up to fifteen percent ethanol, also known as “E15”. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the waiver
exceeded EPA’s authority under subsection 7545 of the Clean Air Act and
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vacated the portion of EPA’s rule granting the waiver. EPA exceeded its
authority because the text and structure of Subsection 7545(h)(4), as well as
its legislative history, support that it applies to E10 alone. The Clean Air
Act limits fuel volatility, which measures how readily gasoline evaporates
in terms of pounds per square inch (“psi”) of Reid Vapor Pressure (“RVP”).
It limited the sale of gasoline with an RVP higher than nine psi during the
summer months when ozone levels are highest but waived this limit by
allowing certain blends containing ten percent ethanol an additional 1-psi.
EPA originally interpreted this waiver to apply only to fuel blends
containing ten percent ethanol but released the new E15 rule extending the
waiver to fuel blends containing at least ten percent ethanol at the
President’s request. EPA argued, unsuccessfully, that the word “contains”
in the statute established a threshold amount of ethanol acceptable as
opposed to a ceiling. The court held that the phrase, “blends containing
gasoline and ten percent ethanol,” was unambiguous because its plain
meaning and EPA’s previous interpretation suggested it meant blends
containing ten percent ethanol, not a 10 percent minimum of ethanol. Thus,
the Clean Air Act precluded EPA’s 1-psi waiver to E15. Finally, the court
held that this waiver portion of the E15 Rule was severable because
severability depends on the issuing agency’s intent and EPA explicitly
stated that Section II was to be severable.
Clarke v. Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2021 WL 15808291 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 22, 2021)
Landowner filed a Clean Water Act cause of action against Company.
The district court gave Landowner leave to amend its complaint after it
granted in part and denied in part Company’s motion to dismiss. After
Landowner filed its First Amended Complaint, Company filed a second
motion to dismiss Individual the claims for the following reasons: (1) the
discharges in the complaint amounted to a single CWA violation that first
accrued decades ago rather than a series of CWA violations for each
discharge, therefore the CWA claim was barred by statute of limitations; (2)
the CWA claim was improper because it failed to allege an ongoing
discharge by a “person”; (3) The CWA claim failed to allege on ongoing
discharge from a “point source”; and (4) Clarke did not provide adequate
notice of the claim in NOI. The court denied Company’s motion based on
its findings. First, whether Landowner’s claims fall within statute of
limitations was a material dispute because Individual cited case law that
supported treating each discharge as a separate offense. Second, the factual
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dispute as to who or what caused the discharges cannot be resolved at the
pleadings stage. Third, Landowners’ description was sufficient enough at
pleadings stage to describe point source. Last, the NOI sufficiently notified
Company of its activities alleging to violation and the location of its
discharges.
Natural Resources Defense Council v. McCarthy 993 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir.
2021).
Environmental alliance filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah for declaratory and injunctive relief against
field manager and alleged that field manager violated NEPA and the APA
by failing to analyze the environmental consequences of its action to lift the
temporary closure order and open the Factory Butte area to cross-country
OHV use. Environmental alliance requested that the court set aside the field
manager’s decision to lift the Factory Butte closure order and re-impose the
closure order until the agency complied with NEPA. field manager
countered with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under which
relief can be granted. The district court sided with field manager and
granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice because the field manager’s
decision to impose a temporary closure order was exempt from NEPA
analysis, and the decision to lift the temporary closure order is nondiscretionary. Environmental alliance timely appealed. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals was charged with reviewing whether the field manager’s
decision to lift a temporary closure order under 43 C.F.R. § 8341.2(a) is
likewise a non-discretionary action, such that environmental analysis under
NEPA is not required. NRDC argued that (1) the field manager retains
discretion to lift the temporary closure order even after it determines the
“adverse effects are eliminated and measures implemented to prevent
recurrence,” and (2) the field manager’s determination that “the adverse
effects are eliminated and measures implemented to prevent recurrence” is
also itself discretionary. In either case, the Plaintiffs contend, environmental
analysis under NEPA is required. field manager argued that NEPA analysis
is not required because (1) the agency has no discretion to temporarily close
an area, and no discretion to keep the closure order in place once the
requisite determination has been made, and (2) the determination that “the
adverse effects are eliminated and measures implemented to prevent
recurrence” is not an open-ended act of discretion; rather, just like the
initial determination that OHVs are “causing or will cause adverse effects”
in the first place, it is a judgment triggering mandatory action under the
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regulation. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court because (1) an
ordinary reading of the regulation requires the field manager to lift a
temporary closure order once it finds that “the adverse effects are
eliminated and measures implemented to prevent recurrence.” The
regulation plainly does not allow the field manager to maintain the
temporary closure order after it has made the requisite finding, and (2) the
field manager need not conduct environmental analysis before lifting a
temporary closure order because an environmental analysis here would not
influence whether the field manager lifts a temporary closure order.
Shafer & Freeman Lakes Environmental Conservation Corporation v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 992 F.3d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2021)
Coalition petitioned for review Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s approval of Oakdale Dam Procedures. Procedures were put
in place to limit endangered mussel death. Coalition sought to invalidate
FERC’s decision by citing errors in Biological Opinion that influenced that
decision. Coalition challenged the scientific basis of the Fish and Wildlife
Service's new dam operation procedures by claiming the following: (1)
FERC's scientific conclusions are undeserving of deference because the
personnel who worked on the Biological Opinion lacked hydrological
expertise; (2) Linear scaling is an inappropriate scientific tool for managing
the flow out of a dam on a day-to-day basis, especially during low flows,
and keeping lake levels relatively constant is a better method for ensuring
“natural” flow rates on the Tippecanoe River;, and (3) by requiring water
flow measures that accord with its linear scaling model and that can
materially reduce the level of Lake Freeman during low-flow events, the
Service's reasonable and prudent measure is a major change, in violation of
a regulation that requires the Fish and Wildlife Service (“The Service”) to
only use “minor changes” in a proposed agency action. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted in party and
denied in part. The held that the FERC acted reasonably in relying on the
Service's resulting scientific judgments in its Biological Opinion for the
following reasons: (1) the FERC’s Biological Opinion was based upon both
hydrology and biology, and the Service personnel had relevant expertise in
biology; (2) the Commission acted reasonably in relying on the Service's
resulting scientific judgments in its Biological Opinion because the Service
acted reasonably in using a linear scaling methodology. On the third point,
the court remanded for a reasoned explanation by the Service of its “minor
change” regulation's application because the Service and FERC made errors
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in analyzing whether the Service's reasonable and prudent measure
qualified as “minor.” The Court agreed with NIPSCO’s argument that the
appropriate remedy for the agency error was a remand without vacating
either the Incidental Take Statement or the FERC’s orders.
State
Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 255 A.3d 289 (Pa. 2021).
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation (“PEDF”) brought
declaratory judgment action against Commonwealth, challenging, under
Environmental Rights Amendment (“ERA”), the constitutionality of
budget-related decisions that resulted in additional oil-and-gas lease sales
on state forest and game lands. The Commonwealth Court granted
summary relief to Commonwealth and PEDF appealed. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The case
returned to the Commonwealth Court, and PEDF appealed on the decision
entered on remand. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed. First,
based on contract law, the revenue from upfront bonus payments, rentals,
and penalty interest for leases qualified as income and not the sale of trust
assets. The inchoate lease used bonus payments as consideration, and the
rental payments and late fees had no bearing on the execution of the lease.
Second, the income could not be diverted from the corpus to the general
fund for non-trust purposes. The disposition of income is determined by the
language of ERA, which did not provide a mechanism to allocate revenue
from income based on the use of trust assets because the settlors did not
intend to create any income entitlements, nor had Commonwealth done so
before. Income generated from revenue streams was required to be returned
to the corpus to benefit all the people. Third, based on the settlors’ intent
derived from the language unifying the interest of current and future
generations, the beneficiaries’ interests were simultaneous. As such,
Commonwealth, as trustee, had a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries to
administer the trust in light of its purpose, which was conservation and
maintenance of public natural resources. The court ordered all income be
returned to the corpus to serve its purpose for and found Sections 1604-E,
1605-E, and 1912 of the Supplemental General Appropriations Act of 2009
unconstitutional.
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Lovejoy v. Jackson Res. Co., No. 2:20-cv-00537 (S.D. W.Va. July 16,
2021) (order denying in part and granting in part a motion to dismiss).
This is an order on Company’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Company is
the past owner of a natural gas well and pipeline facility on Plaintiff’s
property. Plaintiff brought seven claims against Company after becoming
concerned hazardous waste from Company’s facility had migrated (or
threatened to migrate) onto her property. The claims are: (1) recovery of
response costs associated with the contaminated site under federal law, (2)
citizen relief suit from permitting violations under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the West Virginia Hazardous
Waste Management Act (WVHWMA), (3) citizen relief for judicial
abatement of an imminent and substantial endangerment under RCRA, (4)
judicial abatement of a public nuisance under West Virginia law, (5) relief
for a private nuisance, (6) negligence, and (7) strict liability. The court
denied Company’s motion regarding the first claim. The court found the
claim “plausibly state[d] a claim to relief” because Plaintiff demonstrated
Company’s facility could be the source of contaminants. The court granted
Company’s motion regarding the second claim because the permitting
violation was not applicable to past owners, like Company. The court
denied Company’s motion regarding the third claim. The court held
Plaintiff’s claim was sufficiently plausible because the contaminants found
could cause harm. The court granted Company’s motion regarding the
fourth claim because the Plaintiff did not establish a plausible possibility
that there was a general public endangerment to establish a public nuisance.
The court denied Company’s motion regarding the fifth claim because the
Plaintiff plausibly alleged private nuisance by showing the contaminants
interfered with use and enjoyment of her land and water. The court denied
Company’s motion regarding the sixth claim because the Plaintiff could
establish the elements of negligence. The court granted Company’s motion
regarding the seventh claim because transportation of natural gas is not an
abnormally dangerous activity.
Rocky Mountain Peace & Just. Ctr. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 18cv-01017-PAB (D. Colo. July 9, 2021) (order on an appeal of
administration actions).
The question presented was whether the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) “followed the proper procedural processes in approving limited
modifications to the planned multi-use trail system.” The court found that
FWS did follow the proper procedure and entered judgment for FWS.
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Plaintiffs claimed FWS violated the National Environmental Policy Act by
failing to include a supplemental environmental impact statement (EIS) and
“improperly [relied] on categorical exclusions rather than conducting an
environmental assessment” in FWS’s environmental action statement
(EAS). Under 40 C.R.F. § 1502.9(c), an agency must prepare an EIS if
there are substantial changes proposed relevant to environmental concerns,
or if there is new information available that could affect the proposed plan’s
impact. Plaintiffs alleged the proposed modifications to existing trails and
the creation of a new one-mile trail were substantial changes to the plan.
The court found two of the trails did not need a supplemental EIS because
they were not currently being modified and the new trail did not need a
supplemental EIS because FWS did not arbitrarily or capriciously rely on a
“finding of no significant impact.” Plaintiffs also alleged that a recent flood
and “new” plutonium levels were significant new information that required
a supplemental EIS. The court found Plaintiffs did not submit enough
evidence to support the contention that the flood did damage that would
require a supplemental EIS. Further, the court found there was not a
requirement to remeasure plutonium levels given that a recent previous
determination found the levels were fine. Plaintiffs alleged that FWS should
not have relied on categorical exclusions to streamline the implementation
of the proposed plan because there were six “extraordinary circumstances”
that apply. The court found FWS did not improperly rely on the categorical
exclusions because FWS’s decision that the no extraordinary circumstances
applied was not arbitrary or capricious.
Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. 5 Star Feedlot, Inc., 486 P.3d 250 (Colo. 2021).
During a once-in-a-half-century rainstorm, a feedlot company’s
(“Company”) wastewater contamination ponds overflowed. The
contaminated rain-wastewater overflow traveled several miles over land
and into the South Fork of the Republic River, killing an estimated 15,000
fish. Pursuant to section 33-6-110(1), C.R.S. (2020), the State initiated a
civil action to recover the value of the fish. The district court sided with the
State, granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, denied the
Company’s motion for summary judgment, and ordered the Company to
pay $625,755.50 in damages. On appeal, the appellate court reversed,
holding that the State failed to prove what the statute requires: that the
Company “acted knowingly” or performed an “unlawful voluntary act”.
The appellate court held that the discharge made its way to the river by an
act of God—the rainstorm—not a voluntary act. In a plurality opinion, the
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Supreme Court of Colorado held that the State failed to prove the Company
acted voluntarily, a requirement implied by the history and legislative
structure regarding the meaning of “take” within the statute. The Supreme
Court did not reach the issue of whether there is a scienter requirement
within the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgement of the
appellate court and remanded with instructions to enter judgment against
the State and in the Company’s favor.
Jacques v. Comm’r of Energy and Env’t Prot., 203 Conn. App. 419, A.3d
40 (2021).
Citizen sought an injunction to stop the government from a state park
redevelopment. Government had the claim dismissed for lack of standing
because of sovereign immunity. The Court affirms the trial courts holding
that Citizen lacks standing because of sovereign immunity. There are three
exceptions to sovereign immunity. First, when the legislature waives it.
Second, when the plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated. Third,
when there is a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct. Here, the
legislature did not waive sovereign immunity, the Court deals with the last
two exceptions. The Court held that Citizen’s constitutional rights were not
violated. Citizen alleges they were because she was not allowed to speak at
a hearing. The Court says this is not a constitutional right. Next, the
wrongful conduct allegation. The wrongful conduct that citizen alleges is a
procedural one. Citizen was not allowed to speak at a meeting and question
the decision makers. Citizen cites a statute that gives her a right to speak at
proceedings. The court rules that this meeting was not a proceeding. The
Court defines proceedings as adversarial, that was not the case here. Also,
even if there is a procedural violation, the procedural violation being
alleged would have to reasonably lead to wrongful conduct. Here, it does
not. The court dismissed the case for lack of standing.
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